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ABSTRACT 
The term response generalization has been poorly defined and has, over many years, been a 
source of controversy for applied researchers who must grapple with results that show changes 
in behaviors outside of the response class targeted by their intervention. The present discussion 
seeks to differentiate response generalization from such terms as response covariation and 
induction. Instead, response generalization is redefined in the context of response classes and 
concurrent schedules of reinforcement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 
 
In Science of Human Behavior, B. F. Skinner (1953) observed that the 
reinforcement of a response increases the probability of other responses 
 
that are similar. The spread of reinforcing effect from one behavior to others 
has been referred to by Stokes and Baer (1977) as a type of generalization 
akin to the spread of effect across settings, time, and trainers. Baer, 
Wolf, and Risley (1968) suggested “a behavioral change may be said to 
have generality if it proves durable over time, if it appears in a wide variety 
of possible environments, or if it spreads to a wide variety of related 
behaviors’ (italics added) (p. 96). However, the use of different behavioral 
terms to describe generalization of behavior is pervasive in applied 
literature, often to the detriment of clarity and conciseness. One such term 
is response generalization. The purpose of this paper is to define the construct 
of response generalization in the context of response classes and differentiate 
the term from other phenomena related to the co-occurrence of 
behavior. 
 
Ludwig and Geller (1991, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2000) have used the 
term “response generalization” to interpret the effects of safety programs 
which not only increased the behavior targeted by the intervention but also 
increased other safety-related behaviors that were not targeted by the intervention. 
The use of this term seemed to be consistent with definitions of 
response generalization provided by prominent behavior modification 
texts. For example, Kazdin (2001) refers to response generalization as 
“changes in behavior or responses other than those that have been trained 
or developed . . . which occurs (italics added) if a specific response is developed 
through reinforcement or other procedures and this systematically 
alters other behaviors that have not been directly trained” (p. 61). 
Likewise, Martin and Pear (1992) state that response generalization occurs 
“when a behavior becomes more probable in the presence of a stimulus 
or situation as a result of a similar behavior having been strengthened 
in the presence of that stimulus or situation” (p. 155). 
 
 
However, the use of the term “response generalization” is not wholly 
agreed upon (see Austin, 2001 and Houchins & Boyce, 2001 in this issue). 
A seminal publication on generalization by Stokes and Baer (1977) sidestepped 
the “controversy concerning terminology” (p. 350) and asked the 
reader to consider a temporary definition of “behavioral” generalization 
(they did not use the term response generalization). In reality, response 
generalization may be only one of many descriptions for the co-occurrence 
of behavior. To group all descriptions under the rubric of “generalization” 
may not only be ambiguous, but may also have low utility for 
explaining research results and refining future intervention strategies. 
 
 
SHARED STRUCTURE: THE RESPONSE CLASS 
 
 
It is presumed that intervention programs that are associated with response 
generalization cause a “. . . spread of effect . . . to other responses 
not included in the reinforced class . . .” (Catania, 1979).” The concept of 
response classes provides a useful heuristic through which response generalization 
and it’s related concepts can be discussed. It is useful because, 
in an otherwise arbitrary system of possible behavioral groupings, response 
classes can accommodate the organization of behaviors through an 
instrumental and/or functional similarity. 
 
A response may be defined in many different ways. A complete response 
may be defined as a single neuron pulse in an arm, hand gripping a 
safety belt, all the movements required in fastening a safety belt, or the execution 
of an automobile trip without accident or injury (i.e., “safe driving”). 
One could include a set of topographically dissimilar behaviors 
such as turn signal use, driving speed, and/or complete stopping at intersections 
as part of an overall class of responses resulting in safe driving. 
When implementing applied interventions we often do not operate on a 
specific movement or even on a single behavior, instead we reinforce a 
class of responses (Catania, 1979). Thus, a “response class” which may be 
defined as one behavior (consisting of many movements) or as an assortment 
of behaviors required for a contingency outcome. 
 
The behavioral term operant was used by Skinner (1938) to define response 
classes in terms of a common effect of behaviors on the environment. 
Behaviors that have a common effect on the environment can be 
described as functionally similar (Keller & Schoenfeld, 1950). “Safetybelt 
use” can be considered the outcome of many different movements all 
of which are members of the same response class due to their functional 
similarity. Sitting in a car seat, reaching across your body, pulling the 
safety belt back across your body and inserting it into the lock has a collected 
effect on the environment by securing the safety belt into place. 
When safety belt use is reinforced then all the movements that go into 
safety belt use are also reinforced. 
 
When the response is related to both antecedents and consequences, the 
correspondence is termed a discriminated operant (Catania, 1979; 
Johnston & Pennypacker, 1982; Skinner, 1938). A discriminated operant 
response class only exists in the presence of (or when preceded by) a certain 
antecedent condition (i.e., a discriminative stimulus) and consequence 
(e.g., reinforcer). For example, if an individual only comes to a 
complete stop at a stop sign when a police officer is present to avoid a 
costly ticket (cf. Herrick et al., 1959), the class of responses used to engage 
the brake peddle is labeled the discriminated operant. 
 
 
My students have pointed out to me after collecting driving data in the 
field that drivers tend to sit up straight in their car seat when they see a police 
officer. This happens even though one cannot get a ticket for “slouching.” 
Thus, slouching is not part of a discriminated operant response class 
that may be operated on when one comes in contact with the 
discriminative stimuli of a stop light and police officer. Why do these 
and other driving behaviors change in the face of this stimulus set? One 
may say, and my students have, that sitting up straight is part of what 
people consider “safe driving,” along with turn-signal use, safety-belt use, 
car maintenance, and the like. And it is the unsafe operation of the vehicle 
that results in the consequence from the police officer. Is some broader, 
undefined response class (e.g., “safe driving”) also being operated on beyond 
the discriminative operant (e.g., coming to a complete stop at a stop 
sign in the presence of a police officer)? 
 
Skinner (1938) observed in The Behavior of Organisms “The three 
term contingency will obey the laws which apply to it as experimentally 
treated, but it is not necessarily totally unrelated to the rest of the behavior 
of the organism” (p. 168). 
 
 
Structure as Arbitrary 
 
Defining a response class beyond the discriminated operant suggests 
that a nearly infinite variety of movements and behaviors can be grouped 
meaningfully into hypothetical structures. Thus, the broader grouping of a 
response class beyond the discriminated operant is inherently arbitrary because 
we have no conventional level of analysis whereby a response is always 
described. The chemistry community has arrived at a level of 
analysis involving electrons, protons and neurons to describe the structure 
of atoms. This designation was essential in developing the periodic table 
made up of 103 combinations of neurons and electrons known as elements. 
Elements, by definition, are integral structures, not made up of 
other elements; they are autonomous. To transfer this analogy to behavior 
would imply that, given the structure of the three-term contingency, we 
would be able to identify integral patterns of behavior beyond response 
topography or movements. However, the arbitrary nature of defining response 
classes makes this impossible. “All description is partial description” 
(Bower & Hilgard, 1981, p. 178). 
 
Since feasibly any combination of movements and behaviors can be 
operated upon, or shaped experimentally, Baer (1981) argued any structure 
of behavior beyond topography and the three-term contingency is arbitrary, 
not necessary (prerequisite): 
 
 
            If, in the analytic study of behavior, structures are made, demolished, 
and remade easily, frequently, and with increasing generality 
across behaviors, species, and settings, it will be inevitable to ask 
whether all behavioral structures might be alike in this respect. Experimental 
structures represent strong cases for this question: we 
know how they are made and unmade. . . . Thus this strong case is 
likely to push us toward a null hypothesis: Behavior has no necessary 
structure other than trivial. (p. 219) 
According to Baer’s argument (1981) the example of a “safe driving” response 
class is only hypothetical until operated upon. The designation of a 
response class is based on effects of experimental operations, essentially 
viewing a response by its correspondence with environmental antecedents 
and consequences. This view of the world implies that response classes are 
a product of natural contingencies acting on the subject and not a reflection 
of a mediating cognition or skill possessed by the subject. 
 
However, as Baer himself pointed out: 
It is important to remember that in behavioral structures importance 
is as significant a question as necessity. Some structures of behavior 
may be quite arbitrary, in terms of the structure of the universe and 
the laws of behavior, but may be extremely common and urgently 
important, in terms of the organization of our society and its effects 
on our behavior. (p. 251) 
 
Indeed, to create an effective, socially valid intervention in applied settings, 
it is necessary (appropriate) to derive a working structure from 
which to intervene and measure. This conceptualization of response 
classes issues a challenge for applied researchers to operationally define a 
class of responses from the plethora of arbitrary combinations of seemingly 
functional behavior. 
 
 
RESPONSE COVARIANCE 
 
When studying humans, many researchers have stressed the need for a 
broader conception of response class, apart from the basic topographical 
distinction (e.g., Johnston & Pennypacker, 1980; Wahler, 1975; Wahler 
& Fox, 1981a; Willems, 1974). Malott, Whaley, and Malott (1997) 
suggest that a response class can also include behaviors which serve 
similar functions by producing similar outcomes (see also 
Miltenberger, 2001). Safety belt use, complete stopping, maintaining a 
 
two car-length distance when following, turn signal use, car maintenance 
can all be logically considered to contribute to the safe operation 
of an automobile. Such logically derived “schemas” of functionally- 
similar safe driving behaviors can be investigated more thoroughly 
through observing covariance between behaviors. 
 
Notable efforts have been made to specify and isolate methodologically 
the existing interrelationships between behaviors (e.g., Elliott, Huizinga, 
& Menard, 1988; Ludwig & Geller, 2000; Voelts & Evans, 1982; Wahler, 
1975; Wahler&Fox, 1980, 1981a). A first step in deriving a functional response 
class is to probe for behaviors that are observed to be correlated 
during a naturalistic baseline period. This can be assessed through the correlation 
coefficient. However, when many behaviors are observed over 
relatively long periods of time, factor analysis and cluster analysis (Voeltz 
& Evans, 1982; Wahler, 1975), as well as regression analysis (Martens & 
Witt, 1984) can be applied. Pigott, Fantuzzo, and Gorsuch (1987) suggested 
using a scatterplot to analyze the correlation between baseline and 
post-baseline observations (for a demonstration of this method see Ludwig 
& Geller, 2000). 
 
The term response covariance has been used to refer to observed correlations 
between behaviors (Kazdin, 1982; Pigott, Fantuzzo, & 
Gorsuch, 1987; Wahler, 1975). When behaviors covary (i.e., change together) 
the behaviors may (1) be functionally related and operate concomitantly 
to attain the same outcome, and/or (2) be dependent on one another 
resulting from response chains or compatibility (as in the matching law). 
It is important to note that the first explanation is not exclusive of the second 
explanation. 
 
The terms response covariation and response generalization are often 
used synonymously. Such a treatment of these terms often is confusing 
and may be misleading. Response covariation is a descriptive term that 
merely describes the empirical relationship between observed behaviors. 
What response covariation describes, as Figure 1 illustrates, are changes 
in one behavior (labeled as “R”) correlate with changes in other behaviors 
(labeled as “ROther”) without considering the locus of the change (i.e., the 
contingency control the responses). On the other hand, changes in non-targeted 
behaviors via response generalization are the product of contingencies. 
 
Response covariation and response generalization are not exclusive of 
each other and are not contraindicative. Response generalization can occur 
in the context of covariation. This is demonstrated in Figure 2 that 
shows the data from a pizza deliverer from a study reported in Ludwig, 
Geller, and Clarke (2002). Driver C55’s complete stopping and turn signal 
 
 
 
 
 
use covaried rather consistently during baseline and a group goal setting 
and feedback phase (as circled at points “A”). This suggests that the driver 
came to a complete stop on many of the same occasions that he used his 
turn signal. Then as the driver began to respond to the second intervention 
phase that offered individualized feedback targeting turn signal use, a corresponding 
increase in complete stopping also occurred, especially on the 
occasions when the driver used his turn signal (as circled at point “B”). 
 
However, covariation is not necessary for response generalization nor 
do all covarying behaviors generalize. An example of this occurred in the 
data reported by Ludwig, Biggs, Wagner, and Geller (2002) whereby turn 
signal and safety belt use appeared to covary during baseline (as circled at 
point “A”) in Driver A103. However, as Figure 3 suggests, the increase in 
turn signal use during a competition intervention was not associated with 
an increase in safety belt use (as circled at point “B”). 
 
The logical categorizing of behaviors around a common outcome or the 
observation of behaviors being correlated during naturalistic observations 
cannot, however, establish conclusively that these behaviors are part of a 
response class. Such a claim is a causal statement. A response class is defined 
through its relationship within a three-term contingency. While hypothetical 
groupings of behaviors may provide useful heuristics for 
descriptive purposes, such descriptions only describe observed 
covariation between behaviors. They do not provide a reasonable explana- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tion as to why response generalization occurs. Response generalization 
occurs in the presence of contingencies and is a product of contingencies. 
 
 
 
RESPONSE GENERALIZATION 
 
An experimental intervention specifies what behavior(s) are in the operated 
response class as a set of discriminated operants. An operated response 
class refers to the behavior(s) targeted by the reinforcing 
contingencies in an intervention being studied experimentally. Using this 
term will help us distinguish between response classes targeted from a 
current intervention and response classes occurring naturally or from previous 
reinforcement events. For example, if we provide a reinforcer in our 
intervention targeting complete intersection stopping will operate on all 
movements/behaviors required to bring the vehicle to a stop. In this case 
complete intersection stops serve as the operated response class. Response 
generalization refers to changes occurring in behaviors outside of 
the operated response class concurrent to the intervention operations. 
 
For example, targeting safety belt use in the context of an intervention 
will operate on all movements functionally capable to produce a fastened 
belt. However, in the case of Ludwig and Geller (1991, 1999a) turn signal 
use also increased even though it was not operated on by the intervention 
(i.e., part of the operated response class specified by the intervention). A 
graphic example of response generalization in a pizza deliverer, taken 
from data reported in Ludwig and Geller (1991) appears in Figure 4 showing 
Driver C90’s safety belt use and turn signal use both drastically increasing 
during an awareness intervention targeting safety belt use. 
 
If we say that response generalization is a product of contingencies we 
are conceptually challenged by the fact that, by definition, generalized behaviors 
cannot be a part of the operated response class. We must determine 
what contingencies are impacting the generalized behaviors. Two 
explanations are possible: (1) induction and (2) concurrent schedules 
maintaining other response classes. 
 
 
Induction 
 
There is a fundamental distinction between induction and differentiation. 
The initial effect of reinforcement is an increase in responding 
among many movements, some not directly associated with the reinforcer. 
This spread to other topographically similar responses is called induction. 
For example, Catania (1979) presented hypothetical data of rats 
 
 
 
attaining food pellets contingent on poking its nose through correct slots 
on a wall with 15 horizontal slots. When reinforcement was contingent on 
nose-poke through positions 9-12 then, initially, increased responding to 
other positions not included in the reinforced class was expected. As reinforcement 
trials continued, the rat’s responses become more and more restricted 
to the particular position(s) of reinforced responses. In turn, 
non-targeted responses decreased in frequency. The restriction of responding 
to only the reinforced behavior(s) is called differentiation. According 
to Catania (1979), induction is the inverse of differentiation. 
 
As induction is discussed in learning texts (Catania, 1979; Kimble, 
1961) the phenomena is rarely considered past of topographical similarity, 
temporal similarity, or a comparison of effort across responses. Examples 
include dogs lifting legs not conditioned to a buzzer-shock (Kellogg, 
1939), rats adapting to specific pressures of bar pressing (Skinner, 1938), 
eyeblink latencies during the interval between the CS and UCS (Boneau, 
1958), and across amplitudes of thumb contractions (measured by 
microvolts) in humans (Hefferline & Keenan, 1963). 
 
Initially, the term “induction” in operant conditioning was influenced 
by Pavlov’s (1927) descriptions of positive and negative induction. Pavlov’s 
use of the term referred to increased (or decreased) responding 
caused by the ordering of the stimulus. The idea of induction in operant 
conditioning was also influenced by work done on stimulus generalization 
and was expected to conform to the notions of generalization gradients 
and differentiation. As a result, induction was often only considered 
across some physical continuum of responding such as variations in the 
presentation of a behavior (e.g., pressure or latency) or across topographically 
similar movements. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates this conceptualization of induction. An environmental 
stimulus (labeled “SD/SR”) results not only in changes within the 
target behavior (labeled “RTarget”) but also influences changes in other behaviors 
(labeled “ROther”). This occurs because the reinforcing stimulus 
has not been differentiated to just the target response and thus influences 
other behaviors. 
 
A problem arises, however, when using induction as an explanation for 
response generalization. Response generalization takes place across functionally 
similar behaviors and these behaviors are often quite topographically 
disparate. Functionally similar behaviors often do not conform to 
some easily identifiable physical continuum. Thus, assuming response 
generalization is the same as induction, similar to the properties of stimulus 
generalization (see the argument made by Houchins & Boyce, 2002), 
may lead to confusion when adapting the concept to the applied setting. 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the use of induction as a metaphor for response generalization 
may be useful. The implication of induction is that the contingency 
operations did not differentiate adequately to emit a specific response 
while omitting other alternatives. If the operations of an intervention program 
do not adequately differentiate a specific behavior, individuals may 
fail to discriminate between the target response and other behaviors. Thus, 
they might emit a variety of behaviors other than the target behavior. 
 
In fact, it is possible that changes in nontargeted behaviors that are attributed 
to response generalization could be otherwise due to researchers’ failure 
to demonstrate tight control over all aspects of the antecedents and 
consequences offered in the intervention. Indeed, Stokes and Baer (1977) 
seemed to agree with this conceptualization when they called for the use 
of “loose training” and “indiscriminable contingencies” in their suggestions 
regarding how to increase generalization across settings, subjects, 
trainers, time, and behaviors. Therefore, an expanded conceptualization 
of induction may indeed explain the results of some studies showing a 
spread of effect to other behaviors (see the argument made by Austin, 
2001, in this issue). 
 
However, there are a few data-driven arguments that require us to go 
beyond simply considering response generalization as a failure to control 
the critical variables sufficiently: 
 
1. Attempts to gain tighter control over intervention operations in order 
to differentiate the target behavior can result in no decreases in 
the amount of response generalization (Ludwig & Geller, 2000). 
 
Differentiation can be accomplished by making sure the intervention 
does not errantly specify some other behaviors as part of the operations. 
Such procedures that we have used in field settings include meetings with 
the intervention deliverers (often managers) instructing them not to mention 
any other behaviors than those targeted during intervention meetings 
or during regular interactions (Ludwig & Geller, 1991, 1997), conducting 
post-intervention surveys of participants asking if other behaviors had 
been mentioned during the time period in questions (Ludwig & Geller, 
1991, 1997, 2000), videotaping intervention procedures to determine that 
no references were made to other behaviors (Ludwig & Geller, 1991, 1997; 
Ludwig, Geller, and Clarke, unpublished) study, or conducting the intervention 
via memos (Ludwig, 2000) that were specific to only the single 
behavior targeted by the intervention thereby nullifying any superfluous 
contact made with participants. 
 
Differentiation can also be accomplished by making the contingencies 
more specifically related to the targeted behavior (e.g., via tangible rewards 
for correct responding). For example, studies that use individualized 
feedback and rewards for a specific behavior (Ludwig, Biggs, 
Wagner, & Geller, 2002) to further differentiate the target behavior resulted 
in no decreases in the amount of response generalization. This hypothesis 
regarding differentiation and response generalization warrants 
further planned studies and empirical evidence in order to verify this argument. 
 
2. A “loose training” explanation would assume that all changes in 
other behaviors would occur in the same direction as the intended 
target of the intervention or at least with the same desired effect 
(e.g., increase in safety belt use associated with a decreased, but desirable, 
frequency of speeding). Thus, the use of induction as a metaphor 
does not account for changes in non-targeted behaviors in the 
opposite direction of the targeted behavior. Janssen (1994) found 
that when hard-core nonusers of safety belts were forced to 
buckle-up, they drove faster, followed more closely behind vehicles 
in front of them, changed lanes at higher speeds, and braked later 
when approaching obstacles. Ludwig and Geller (1999b) showed a 
decrease in safety-belt use after deliverers received turn-signal policies. 
Geller, Casali, and Johnson (1980) found that as safety-belt in- 
 
ducement interventions became more intrusive and controlling, 
people were more likely to defeat the system by either sitting on a 
buckled safety belt or completely disconnecting the system. Ludwig 
and Geller (2000) equated these results to be examples of 
countercontrol. 
 
To demonstrate possible examples of countercontrol at an individual 
level Figures 6 and 7 show data taken from pizza deliverers during two 
different studies (Ludwig & Geller, 1997; Ludwig et al., 2002, respectively). 
Driver C49’s complete stops and turn signal use, shown in Figure 
6, covaried somewhat during baseline (circled as point “A”). However, as 
the driver experienced the assigned goal setting and feedback targeting 
complete stopping his turn signal use drastically declined (noted as point 
“B” showing separation from the celeration line) to only a few occurrences 
over the rest of the study. Likewise, Driver A74’s turn signal use 
and complete stops, shown in Figure 7, seemed to covary during baseline 
(circled as point “A”). When a competition intervention that rewarded 
high turn signal use was implemented, Driver A74 ceased coming to a 
complete stop for the next 25 observations while he used turn signal almost 
every occurrence (circled as point “B”). 
 
In a study designed to show that an intervention can be programmed to 
demonstrate either a desirable or undesirable change in nontargeted behaviors, 
Ludwig and Geller (1997) showed a decrease in turn-signal use 
when deliverers were assigned a goal to increase their complete stopping 
at intersections. However, when deliverers were allowed to participate in 
the same complete stopping intervention turn signal use increased. These 
findings suggest that an explanation other than loose training is in order. 
Certainly more research is needed to replicate these studies and confirm 
this assertion. 
 
 
Concurrent Schedules 
 
A response class is defined through its association with a three-term 
contingency. In an experimental study, a group of behaviors can be directly 
reinforced in an operated operant class under the control of the experimenter. 
However, in the real world, there are contingencies that 
influence groups of behaviors concurrent with and often independent of 
an experimental intervention. For example, traffic laws can reinforce or 
punish nearly all meaningful driving behaviors with similar SDs (e.g., 
presence of a police officer) and consequences (traffic tickets). Indeed, 
behaviors often are associated through shaping sometime in the person’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
past (e.g., driver training classes) and/or may be presently operated upon 
by means of other contingencies in the environment (e.g., traffic laws). 
These factors may create groupings of behaviors reflecting response 
classes already operated upon in the environment (Elliott, Huizinga, & 
Mernard, 1988). However, the response classes formed by environmental 
contingencies often fall outside of the operated response classes determined 
by our intervention operations. 
 
When trained together, such as during driver training courses or 
driver’s license exams, behaviors may become associated as a response 
class. Baer (1981) suggests, 
Our experience with behavior, when positive, is that behavior is always 
available to be shaped into any reasonable form and brought 
under the control of any reasonable stimulus, and that this can be 
done with more than one behavior at a time, so that behaviors acquire 
interdependencies. (p. 219) 
 
If these prior environmental associations exist then we may have the 
basis for predicting generalization across behaviors beyond the arbitrary 
guess suggested by Stokes and Baer (1977) when they suggested we simply 
“train and hope.” 
 
Behaviors that have some type of functional attribute in common are 
more likely to generalize than novel combinations of behaviors (Carr, 
1988; Kimble, 1961). Behaviors that have been associated sometime in a 
person’s past can be said to have functional similarity based on that past 
reinforcer. Although these associations can differ from one person to the 
next (Wahler, 1975), a case can be made for people having common learning 
histories as dictated by their societal, cultural, or family membership. 
Certainly the majority of people in the United States and other first-world 
countries undergo common driver training courses to become licensed to 
drive. 
 
Likewise, it can be expected that societal and other environmental factors 
(e.g., physics) also operate at any given time to shape and maintain 
behaviors. For example, our society maintains a set of laws that reinforce 
driving behaviors consistent with the safe operation of a vehicle. Indeed, 
driving behaviors may be continuously, negatively reinforced by legal 
(i.e., tickets), social (being yelled at), or physical (damage to car or self) 
consequences (Ludwig & Geller, 2000). 
 
Rule Governed Behavior. A number of researchers (Malott, 1992) 
have suggested that the shaping of behavior (past or present) establishes 
rules describing the correct behaviors to be emitted in certain contexts 
 
and their relationship with a contingency, essentially defining the response 
class. Rules themselves are not discriminative stimuli (i.e., signaling 
the occasion when a certain response will be followed by a 
consequence). Instead rules alter the function of other stimuli and designate 
them as discriminate stimuli (Blakely & Schlinger, 1987; Schlinger 
& Blakely, 1987). Therefore, rules (a) specify contingencies, (b) describe 
performance, (c) and designate discriminate stimuli. Agnew and 
Redmon (1992) also argued that rules alter the function of consequences. 
 
Cerutti (1989) noted that “few drivers would survive learning to stop at 
red traffic lights if the discrimination could only be negatively reinforced 
by avoiding collisions” (p. 262). Instead, rules specify the discriminated 
control of the traffic light over stopping behaviors. Cerrutti used the term 
instructed response class to describe the correspondence between antecedents, 
behaviors, and consequences specified by instructions. This can 
be compared with the operated response class specified by its direct association 
with an intervention contingency. 
 
What is important for our discussion is that a rule need not stipulate 
only a single behavior as part of the response class it influences. Instead, 
when developed over an individual’s lifetime of experiences with societal 
(including work-related) or environmental consequences, rules stipulate a 
number of similar behaviors that are functionally related. Therefore, if 
members of a population engage in common rule-governed behavior 
(based on common learning histories; Wanchisen & Tatham, 1991), then 
it is expected that the behaviors relevant to a rule will correlate and may 
change when interventions consistent with the rules get enacted. 
 
Response Generalization and Concurrent Schedules. Whether a set of 
behaviors act as a response class via concurrent schedules of contingencies 
or via previous shaping and rule governed behavior, the basis for response 
generalization is established. When we deliver our experimental 
interventions we often do so in the context of these concurrent schedules; 
our interventions do not occur in a vacuum (although for experimental 
reasons we may often wish they did). 
 
If the contingencies that we deliver as part of our intervention are compatible 
with these concurrent schedules operating on the same behavior( 
s), the concurrent schedule(s)’ effect on its response class may be 
strengthened. The resulting effect may be similar to that described in Figure 
8. The contingency enacted by the intervention (labeled as “SD/SR: Intervention 
Schedule”) will directly influence the targeted behavior(s) 
(labeled as “RTarget”) or operated response class (point “A”). If the intervention 
operations are compatible with other contingencies and/or rules 
 
(labeled as “SD/SR: Concurrent Schedule”) then it may prompt or otherwise 
activate these concurrent schedules (point “B”). Thus, all members 
of the concurrent schedule’s response class (labeled as “ROther”) will be influenced 
thereby changing along with the targeted behavior (point “C”). 
 
In the context of a Behavior Change Taxonomy, Ludwig and Geller 
(2000) argued that interventions involving individuals can provide a 
context that promotes response generalization. Involvement and ownership 
in an intervention process may contribute to the activation of concurrent 
schedules and/or rule-governed behaviors because individuals 
are given an opportunity to verbalize their previously-held rules. For example, 
in a couple of our studies (Ludwig & Geller, 1991, 1997; Ludwig, 
Geller, & Clarke, unpublished), we asked deliverers why it is a good idea 
to engage in the targeted behavior. To answer this question they often referred 
to legal (i.e., tickets), social (being yelled at), or physical (damage 
to car or self) consequences. These same consequences pertain to driving 
safety behaviors other than that targeted by the intervention. Even 
though these other behaviors were not mentioned during the discussion, 
their relationship with these common verbalized consequences may 
have supported concurrent schedules and/or rule-governed behavior in 
the context of the intervention. Therefore, when interventions were high 
in involvement, targeting one behavior also activated a number of 
rule-governed behaviors as well, some of which we systematically observed. 
The high-involvement interventions reported in Ludwig and 
Geller (1991, 1997) and in Ludwig, Geller, and Clarke (unpublished) 
were all associated with response generalization. 
 
In contrast, some of our interventions (Ludwig, Biggs, Wagner, & 
Geller, 2002; Ludwig & Geller, 1997) focused on external consequences 
such as assigned goals, managerial surveillance, or individual competition. 
In these cases, the target behavior was instrumental in attaining the 
direct external consequences. For example, deliverers were following 
managerial mandates (Ludwig & Geller, 1997, 1999b), or competing for a 
reward (Ludwig et al., 2002). In these situations, no behavior other than 
the target behavior was reinforced by the external consequences. 
 
In Ludwig et al. (2002) no systematic response generalization was observed. 
In the two Ludwig and Geller studies (1997 and 1999b) non-targeted 
behaviors decreased during the intervention. 
 
Countercontrol. It is likely the contingencies delivered by the intervention 
either were not associated with other concurrent schedules/ 
rules or were incompatible with those concurrent 
contingencies/rules. As a result, concurrent contingencies/rules associated 
 
 
 
 
with other safe driving behaviors were not activated. The resulting effect 
may be similar to that described in Figure 9. The contingency enacted 
by the intervention (labeled as “SD/SR: Intervention Schedule”) will directly 
influence the targeted behavior (point “A”). If the intervention operations 
are incompatible with other contingencies (labeled as “SD/SR: 
Concurrent Schedule”) and/or rules then it may replace these schedules 
(point “B”) at least in the context of the intervention. Thus, in the context 
of the intervention operations members of the concurrent contingency response 
class (labeled as “ROther”) will no longer be maintained thereby decreasing 
while the targeted behavior is maintained by the intervention 
(points “C”). It is important to note that these decreases in other behaviors 
probably only take place in the presence of the intervention’s SDs and that 
concurrent contingencies resume control of these behaviors when not in 
the presence of the intervention context. 
 
 
The above scenario is understandable in the context of the pizza delivery 
business. Assuming individual driving behavior was maintained via 
concurrent contingencies and/or rules before being employed, pizza deliverers 
were required to incorporate new behaviors in their capacity as a 
pizza deliverer. For example, from the start, they were taught to review a 
map before beginning their trip, run to their car, and keep their car running 
when going to a customer’s door. It is doubtful the deliverers engaged in 
these behaviors previously or, for that matter, while driving during their 
free time. These behaviors are obviously associated with rules specific to 
their job. We suggest that when an intervention offers rules specific to the 
job, as mandated by the manager or by “top-down” contingencies, then the 
behavior is governed by job-specific contingencies. 
 
Certainly, much more research is needed to determine whether this 
model of response generalization is valid. Such a model of response generalization 
can be empirically tested. Using a yoking procedure in a multiple 
baseline design, one group (i.e., the yoked group) could receive an 
intervention which pairs two behaviors (e.g., A & B), of interest, another 
group could receive an intervention targeting only behavior A, and a third 
would remain as a control. After a return to baseline, all three groups 
could receive an intervention targeting only behavior A. If the yoked 
group shows concurrent changes in both behaviors (e.g., A & B), while the 
others show significantly less changes in behavior B, then response generalization 
has been demonstrated. Conversely, if the other non-yoked 
groups show changes in both behaviors, then one can conclude that both 
behaviors are members of the operated response class. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
According to Baer (1981) any behavior can be associated with any 
other behavior given the right three term contingency. Thus, any association 
between behaviors is arbitrary, not predetermined. Thus, before participating 
in an intervention a person may bring a nearly infinite 
combination of previously associated behaviors. We argue that humans 
experience common contingencies from shared societal and physical environments. 
Because of this many of us share common associations between 
behaviors functionally related to past or current contingencies. We 
can investigate these common associations though naturalistic probes for 
response covariation. 
 
Response generalization “works” when the intervention not only impacts 
the targeted behavior (i.e., operated response class) but also acti- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vates these environmental contingencies. This, in turn, may also 
influence members of the concurrent schedule(s)’ response class(es) and 
result in changes in behaviors, similar to, but not directly targeted by the 
intervention. 
 
Such a conceptualization challenges the research community to cease 
viewing response generalization as simply and primarily a function of induction. 
This will allow us to go beyond a “train and hope” (Stokes & 
Baer, 1977) strategy and more deliberately program for desirable generalization. 
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